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This thesis initially started as a project for a course and was later expanded to become 
subject of a Bachelor's thesis. The end goal of the project and the following thesis was 
to implement technology called core hiding for the IPv6 connections of the learning 
platform SimuNet. Additional objective was to complete the operation as a migration in 
order to replicate the circumstances of a real service provider network. Furthermore, 
the compiling of a thorough documentation of the planning and final implementation 
was a significant motivation for the writing. 
 
The theory section of the thesis introduces and explains the most vital concepts of 
MPLS VPNs. The aim of this is to provide the reader with background information for 
understanding the advanced topic based on MPLS VPN usage: core hiding.  The 
characteristics of MPLS VPNs and core hiding are also considered including the 
options, features and risks concerning their implementation. 
 
The planning and implementation of core hiding are presented following the foundation 
laid by the theory section. The progression between different plans is described and 
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are presented to offer basis for future studies or projects. 
 
The migration operation was successful regardless of not fully meeting the objective of 
near unnoticeable downtime. Further research can be performed to utilize and improve 
the benefits offered by the core hiding implementation. Alternatively, the current 
infrastructure could revised or expanded to fit the future requirements of the network.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Security of a service provider and its customers is an increasingly important 
concern. Distributed denial of service attacks are increasingly commonplace 
and easier to carry out. In addition, intrusions to different devices and systems 
occur every day and often remain unnoticed. These security challenges must 
be met to maintain the availability of services and confidentiality of 
information. 
As both corporate and personal customers become more interested in the 
usage of IPv6 the service providers must begin offering IPv6 connections and 
services. There are numerous ways of implementing this functionality to an 
existing operator network each with their distinct benefits and downsides. One 
of the main issues is the affordability of these solutions and the ability to 
deploy it in an existing IPv4 environment. 
One notable solution to these issues is the implementation and use of MPLS 
L3 VPNs and more specifically core hiding. Core hiding improves security of 
both the VPN customers and the service provider by separating their traffic 
from each other. Additionally, it eases the implementation of IPv6 connections 
significantly by requiring IPv6 only in the provider edge routers. 
1.1 Background 
This subject was first introduced to me at the start of the project course in 
September 2014. The project work was conducted with the help of Markus 
Autio and completed in December 2014. Afterwards the project continued as a 
subject for this thesis. The main goal of the project and the following thesis 
was to test and plan the migration to core hiding in SimuNet. More importantly, 
this migration was to be performed specifically for the existing IPv6 connection 
to Internet. 
The most relevant previous study related to this one is Erno Tolonen’s VPN 
Solutions for Service Providers Migrating to IPv6 which slightly resembles the 
topic of this thesis. However, this thesis focuses more on MPLS L3 VPN and 
the possibilities offered in its usage (Tolonen 2011). A migration to core hiding 
in SimuNet has been attempted before by a student as a part of his thesis. 
Regardless that attempt was unsuccessful and therefore the migration to core 
hiding in IPv6 remained undone. 
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1.2 Scope of the study 
Core hiding is a technique based on the use of MPLS L3 VPN. This thesis 
therefore mainly concentrates on the different requirements of MPLS L3 VPN 
and their use in core hiding. One of the objectives is to illustratively explain the 
distinct roles of each of the components in order to achieve an inclusive 
understanding of the entire architecture surrounding core hiding. This is the 
main goal of the thesis’ theory section. Additionally the possibilities, benefits 
and downsides offered by core hiding are reflected upon regarding the overall 
functionality of the network as well as its security. 
The practical part of the thesis contains the documentation of all the planning 
and testing done in order to accomplish the main objective of this thesis: core 
hiding migration in SimuNet. Furthermore, the course of the migration 
operation is described and its results analyzed. Also possible further studies 
and projects that this migration allows are presented. IPv6 in itself is not a 
major subject despite its presence in the migration operation. 
1.3 SimuNet 
SimuNet is a simulated operator network which offers IPv6 Internet access to 
the ICTLAB learning environment. SimuNet was constructed in a project by 
KyUAS in cooperation with the local service providers. Since then it has acted 
as a R&D platform for various projects and theses while constantly remaining 
“in production”. Therefore core hiding is performed as a migration in SimuNet 
in order to maintain its uninterrupted operation and to imitate a real-life 
situation. (Kettunen 2013.) 
Other learning environments in the ICTLAB of KyUAS include CiscoLAB, 
GameLAB and the newest addition named CyberLAB. CiscoLAB has several 
racks of Cisco routers and switches which are used for case studies and 
exercises of numerous networking courses. This equipment was utilized for 
the majority of testing while preparing for the final migration operation. Since 
SimuNet consists of Cisco devices the commands in this thesis are only 
applicable for Cisco routers. In addition the concepts presented here likely 
resemble Cisco terminology. (KyUAS ICTLAB 2016.) 
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2 MPLS BASICS 
MPLS (Multi-Protocol Label Switching) is a technology which allows packet 
forwarding based on labels. The structure of these labels is relatively simple 
(Figure 1). Label itself is a value that identifies the “destination”. Previously 
experimental field is now used for QoS/CoS (Quality of Service/Class of 
service) purposes. The S bit implies whether the label in question is the last 
label on the stack. Lastly it includes TTL (Time to Live) field with a value that 
propagates from the TTL of the packet which the label gets added to. (Lobo & 
Lakshman 2008, 9-10.)  
   
Figure 1. Structure of a label (Cisco Systems 2016) 
A label is positioned between the layer 2 header and the layer 3 header in the 
packet (Figure 2). For this reason MPLS is often referred to as a L2.5 protocol. 
There can be more than one label inserted between the headers when a 
packet enters MPLS network with the top label in the stack being closest to 
layer 2 header and bottom label before the layer 3 header. (Lobo & Lakshman 
2008, 9-10)  
 
Figure 2. Position of a label in an IP packet (Cisco Systems 2016) 
The placement of a label allows forwarding decisions without affecting the 
underlying layer 3 header. Only the topmost label is examined and that 
information is used to forward the packet towards the destination. Therefore 
the packet itself can contain for example IPv6 traffic that is forwarded through 
an IPv4 MPLS network. Once all the labels are removed from the packet as it 
exits the MPLS network the packet is once again forwarded based on a 
lookup in a routing table.   
2.1 MPLS operations 
MPLS operates in a way somewhat similar to Frame Relay and ATM 
(Asynchronous Transfer Mode) in the manner that the packets are forwarded 
11 
 
through the network. Both the independence from the payload carried through 
the network and the “label” changing behavior resemble its predecessors. 
However, the differences of these technologies in their functionality are not 
compared in this thesis. (Rosen, Viswanathan & Callon 2001, 24-29.) 
2.1.1 PUSH/SWAP/POP 
Three types of operations occur once or more when a packet traverses a 
MPLS network (Figure 3). An ingress edge router in a MPLS network performs 
an operation called PUSH. This means that the router adds a label to the 
packet. This label determines the destination for the packet in the network. 
SWAP occurs when the label is changed by a router along the way. A router 
swaps the label based on its label forwarding table and forwards it through the 
interface indicated for that specific label. This often happens numerous times 
in a MPLS cloud. The destination designated by original label remains the 
same regardless of this happening several times. Once the packet exits the 
MPLS network its label is removed by an operation named POP. This exposes 
the layer 3 header and the forwarding decision is made according to the 
routing table once again. (Ghein 2007, 43-44, 49.)  
 
Figure 3. MPLS label operations (Ghein 2007, 44) 
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In the case of MPLS VPN two labels are usually pushed to a packet at the 
ingress edge of a MPLS network. Bottom label indicates a service on the 
destination router and the top one indicates that specific router as a 
destination. The top label gets swapped several times as it traverses the 
network. Once the packet reaches the egress edge router it pops both the 
labels and forwards to the service indicated by the bottom label. This service 
is usually either a L2 or L3 VPN tunnel endpoint. 
2.1.2 PHP 
PHP (Penultimate Hop Popping) is an operation performed by a last hop 
router before an edge router which would pop both labels. PHP improves the 
efficiency by popping the top label from the packet. This way the bottom label 
is exposed and the egress edge router does not “waste” resources by popping 
a label that indicated it as the destination router. (Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 
40-42.) 
 
Figure 4. PHP in a MPLS network (Juniper Networks 2015) 
To be more precise the router preceding the edge router would normally swap 
the label for another before forwarding it to the edge router. With PHP the 
previous router instead pops the label and forwards the packet without a label 
(Figure 4). Therefore the edge router only needs to route the packet 
accordingly without first popping the label from the packet. (Pepelnjak & 
Guichard 2009, 40-42.)  
2.2 MPLS terminology 
There are several terms used to describe different elements of a network. LER 
(Label Edge Router) is a PE (Provider Edge) router that pushes or pops labels 
from packets as they enter or leave the MPLS network. LSR (Label Switching 
Router) is a P (provider) router that only swaps labels on packets traveling 
through the network and forwards them using purely MPLS. LSRs have no 
knowledge or say regarding the payload of the packets and act only based on 
the labels pushed by the LERs. A LSP (Label Switched Path) is a particular 
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path that a labeled packet travels from the ingress LER to the egress LER. 
This path is determined by the MPLS forwarding table throughout the network. 
LSPs can be considered as tunnels inside the MPLS cloud since the original 
packet remains untouched during transit. Despite this a LSP can also be 
unidirectional meaning the return traffic may traverse a different route through 
the network. (Lobo & Lakshman 2008, 6-8.) 
VPN (Virtual Private Network) is a method of connecting a network or a single 
workstation to another network through an Internet connection. This creates 
the impression of having the two elements connected in the same network. 
Two commonly known applications of this are connecting a laptop to an 
enterprise network for remote work or connecting to a VPN service that hides 
customer activity in the Internet by having the VPN provider forward the traffic 
to its destination instead. Both of these VPN types usually encrypt their traffic 
through the Internet. However, in the case of MPLS VPN connections 
encryption of the traffic is not inherent in the service itself despite the 
possibility of utilizing it still existing. In the context of this thesis VPN refers to 
the MPLS VPN services and tunnels necessary in the implementation of core 
hiding. This type of VPN can connect one or more networks to each other and 
to the Internet through the operator network. More specifically, these VPN 
tunnels start at the ingress LER and end at the egress LER of the service 
provider network. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 12-14.) 
2.3 LDP 
LDP (Label Distribution Protocol) is a protocol that distributes labels within a 
MPLS enabled network. There are two variants of LDP: regular LDP and T-
LDP (Targeted LDP). LDP labels are distributed hop-by-hop. For instance a 
LER randomly generates a label for itself that it then conveys to a directly 
connected LSR. The LSR then installs this label designated to the LER in its 
forwarding table. Furthermore, the LSR randomly generates a label for itself 
and communicates it to the LER which then installs the label in its forwarding 
table. (Andersson, Minei & Thomas 2007, 4-5.) 
T-LDP labels are distributed between two distant routers. Two LERs can use 
this to negotiate labels to be used for a certain service or a tunnel. This way 
both LERs know what label to use for a specific tunnel at the other end of the 
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LSP. Then a LER can for example use a certain label for L3 VPN endpoint in 
the other LER. (Cisco Systems 2005.) 
The labels generated by LDP are used only for the local hop before they are 
swapped to another randomly generated label. Two LSRs most likely have 
different labels for the same LER. For further explanation let’s say a LER 
named PE1 wants to forward a packet to another LER called PE4 and then 
out of the MPLS network. PE1 then pushes two labels to the packet: one for 
the service in PE4 and another to indicate PE4 as a destination. The service 
label has been communicated to it through T-LDP and the top label by a LSR 
named P2 through LDP. PE1 then forwards the packet to P2 which swaps the 
top label to another one told to it by another P router named P3 before 
forwarding the packet. P3 then receives the packet and pops the label for PE4 
and exposes the service label before forwarding the packet to PE4. PE4 does 
a lookup for the bottom label and sends the packet to the service or endpoint 
indicated which then forwards it accordingly.  
In order to determine the best path for a LSP LDP relies upon an IGP (Interior 
Gateway Protocol) such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) or IS-IS 
(Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System). Based on the routing 
information LDP determines the optimal path for each label and more 
specifically through which interface it forwards a labeled packet. Therefore 
LDP relies on the convergence of the IGP for its path selection. Should a link 
in the MPLS network fail the IGP must converge before the proper LSP is 
formed again. Additionally if an interface along a LSP somehow loses LDP 
functionality the LSP is broken as the IGP still believes it to be the best path. 
This can be avoided by enabling synchronization between LDP and the IGP. 
(Juniper Networks 2014.) 
2.4 RSVP-TE 
RSVP (Resource Reservation Protocol) is a protocol for reserving resources 
for data flows in an IP network. RSVP-TE (RSVP - Traffic Engineering) is the 
traffic engineering extension of RSVP. RSVP-TE allows RSVP to use LSPs to 
guide its data flows in an MPLS network. RSVP-TE distributes its labels for 
each manually created path independently from the path selections of the 
IGP. While RSVP-TE can be used to configure specific tunnels with their own 
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allocated resources the configuration for each separate data flow can get 
excessively complex in a larger scale network. (Cisco Systems 2015a.) 
2.5 Segment routing 
Segment routing is a different method of distributing labels and is still relatively 
new as it has not yet been standardized. It can replace LDP as a way of 
distributing labels and possibly even RSVP-TE and other methods of traffic 
engineering. Unlike LDP segment routing has no dependency on the IGP as 
the labels are distributed through the IGP and not a separate protocol. 
Segment routing can also allocate labels for specific links or even segments of 
the MPLS cloud. This allows traffic engineering by stacking the necessary 
labels to indicate the desired path. Also a MPLS network using segment 
routing has the same label values called node segment identifiers for a certain 
router or segment throughout the network unlike LDP. (Cisco Systems 2015b.) 
3 MPLS L3 VPN 
MPLS L3 VPN is a VPN technology that utilizes an existing MPLS cloud and 
its label based forwarding to create VPN tunnels between PE routers. These 
tunnels can be configured for IPv4 or IPv6 traffic regardless of which protocol 
the operator network is running. Configuring MPLS L3 VPN and, furthermore, 
core hiding requires understanding of the elements essential for MPLS L3 
VPN. 
3.1 VRF 
VRF (Virtual Routing and Forwarding) is a technology which allows separation 
of routing tables from the GRT (Global Routing Table). GRT is the main 
routing table that remains regardless of any VRFs configured. The 
configuration of VRFs allows segmenting the router to several routing 
instances each of which holds its own routing table and interfaces connected 
to it (Figure 5). This “virtual router” is used to separate interfaces and their 
routing from the ISP core network running MPLS. (Lobo & Lakshman 2008, 
85-86.)  
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Figure 5. A depiction of a router with two VRFs configured 
In Cisco IOS an interface configured to a VRF has its IP address removed as 
it is effectively erased from the GRT. When the IP address is reconfigured to 
the VRF interface it is added to the routing table of that VRF. Any other router 
connected to the VRF interface has no access or visibility to the GRT or any 
interfaces not associated with the same VRF. The same is true of the VRF 
itself. If a connection was attempted from the VRF to an IP address in the 
GRT it would fail. 
In MPLS L3 VPNs VRFs are used to separate the VPN customers from the 
GRT to allow tunneling them through the MPLS cloud to another router that is 
connected to the same VPN. In essence the VRFs are the virtual routers that 
are connected to each other through the ISP network. This is how the 
connection appears to the customer using the VPN. (Lobo & Lakshman 2008, 
85-86.) 
3.2 MP-BGP 
MP-BGP (Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol) is an extension to BGP. In 
MPLS L3 VPNs it is used as a basis for passing routing and label information 
between different PE routers through the MPLS cloud. This information is held 
in VPNv4 or VPNv6 updates. More specifically, these updates contain a prefix 
and a label with which to reach that prefix. This information is passed between 
the PE routers that have customers of the same VPN connected to them. 
(Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 188-190.)  
The neighbors to which VPNv4 or VPNv6 updates are sent to are configured 
under the specified address-family. These VPNv4 or VPNv6 address-family 
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configurations need to be done before any information between the VRFs of 
the same VPN is sent. After the MP-BGP configuration is ready further 
configuration is required for a proper MPLS L3 VPN implementation. 
(Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 191-194.) 
3.3 Route Distinguisher 
Route Distinguishers (RD) are included with the prefix in VPNv4 and VPNv6 
updates. RDs precede the prefix in the update in order to make it unique even 
if another router were to advertise the same route (Figure 6). This allows for 
having redundant connections to one VPN customer connected to separate 
PE routers. It is also possible for several customers to use the same prefix as 
long as the VRFs have a distinct RD configured. (Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 
171-174.) 
 
Figure 6. Structure of VPNv4 address (Behringer 2003, 7) 
The format of a RD is number colon number for example 1:1. However, the 
practices for RD usage vary. It is common to use an AS (Autonomous 
System) number or an IP address before the colon and an administrator 
assigned number after. Both practices are similar to those described by the 
RFC 4364 with the recommendation of only using authorized public IP 
addresses and AS numbers (Rosen & Rekhter 2006, 13-14). The entire RD 
could then be 10.1.2.3:4 for example. However, it is crucial that the RD is 
unique for each VRF in each PE. This ensures the prefixes in the updates are 
always distinct. 
3.4 Route Target 
Route Targets (RT) are actually what connects the VRFs to each other over 
the ISP MPLS network. They are included in an extended community within a 
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VPNv4 or VPNv6 update. (Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 177-180.) Their format 
is the same as with RD but the practices differ as RTs often are only required 
to be unique within a certain VPN. Common practices include using customer 
specific numbers such as contract numbers, AS numbers and IP addresses 
along with an assigned number after the colon. However, the technically 
correct format is the same as that given for the RDs above (Rosen & Rekhter 
2006, 15). 
While configuring a VRF two RTs also need to be configured: import and 
export RT. Import RT dictates which VPNv4 or VPNv6 updates are imported 
to the specified VRF. Export RT determines which RT is used when the VRFs 
own updates are exported to other PE routers. Therefore an import RT needs 
to match the export RT of another PE router in order for the update to be 
accepted. It is common to use the same import and export RT throughout the 
VPN to simplify the configuration unless there is a reason to separate different 
sites of the same VPN from each other. (Pepelnjak & Guichard 2009, 177-
180.) 
3.5 Label allocation modes 
There are several options for allocating labels in MPLS L3 VPNs. They differ 
in the amount of labels they use for routes inside a specific VRF. Three of 
those options are mentioned and considered here. The option which 
consumes the largest amount of labels is per prefix labels. This mode 
allocates a distinct label for each prefix advertised to the other PE routers in 
an update. Another option is to allocate a label per gateway in a specific VRF. 
This reduces the amount of labels used in a VRF. Finally the most efficient 
method concerning label space usage is per VRF allocation mode. In this 
mode only one label is allocated for a particular VRF. (Cisco Systems 2014b)  
In addition to using not consuming a considerable portion of the label space 
per VRF label allocation does not require significantly more performance in 
the lookups compared to the other options. This mode can be enabled in 
Cisco IOS routers with the command mpls label mode all-vrfs protocol bgp-
vpnv4 per-vrf (or mpls label mode all-vrfs protocol bgp-vpnv6 per-vrf). 
(Cisco Systems 2014b.) 
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4 CORE HIDING 
Core hiding is a technique made possible by the use of MPLS L3 VPN and it 
is also the main focus of this thesis. The main principle of core hiding is 
concealing the entire operator network from any other networks connected to 
it. This is achieved by forwarding all traversing traffic with MPLS labels. Even 
Internet traffic can be separated from the core network and forwarded through 
the use of labels. Since all traversing traffic is label switched the ISP can run 
IPv4 in their network and offer IPv6 connectivity to customers by running IPv6 
only in PE router VRFs. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 55-56.) 
4.1 Hiding the core 
Configuring any existing and future customer connections to the ISP in VRFs 
along with the Internet connection(s) allows for complete separation of the 
operator GRT from the customers in VRFs. As mentioned before the 
customers connected to VRFs have no access to the ISP core network and 
only connect to other VRFs in other PE routers. These connections are 
manipulated through the use of RTs and their routing information is handled 
through the VPNv4 or VPNv6 connections in the PE routers. (Behringer & 
Morrow 2005, 55-56.) 
 
Figure 7. A traceroute performed in a laboratory test before implementing core hiding or 
MPLS L3 VPN in the operator network. The ISP address space (172.16.0.0/16) is visible to 
the customer. 
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Figure 8. A traceroute performed in a laboratory test after successful implementation of core 
hiding. Only visible addresses are those of the customer and VRF connections. 
However, by default the core IP addresses can still be visible to traceroute 
attempts (Figure 7). At the very least the hops are shown in the output. This is 
caused by the labels using the TTL values of the packets they are pushed to. 
Thus the hops are visible as the TTL value continues to decrement throughout 
the MPLS network. Fortunately this behavior can be disabled in the PE routers 
to avoid TTL propagation to labeled packets. After the TTL propagation has 
been prevented the hops and addresses of the ISP network are completely 
hidden from the outside traceroute attempts (Figure 8). This blocks any 
attempts to discover the IP addresses or layout of the operator network. (Lobo 
& Lakshman 2008, 20-22.) 
 
Figure 9. TTL propagation throughout a MPLS network (Ghein 2007, 55) 
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If the TTL propagation to the labels is not disabled the existing TTL value of 
the packet entering the MPLS network is propagated to the TTL of the label. 
This value is further decremented as the labeled packet traverses the MPLS 
network. When the label or labels have been popped the MPLS TTL value is 
again propagated to the underlying packet. (Figure 9) Thus the hops of the 
MPLS network are visible in a traceroute if the propagation is not disabled. 
(Ghein 2007, 55.)  
4.2 Address space separation 
Since even the VPN connections are separated from each other through the 
use of RTs each VPN could use the same address space without any 
complications. Naturally, in the case of Internet connections they are still 
required to use distinct public IP addresses in order to access the Internet. 
Regardless of the type of VPN connection they are still fully isolated from the 
GRT. Therefore the ISP can use any address space in the core including 
private addresses as it is no longer connected to any of the outside networks. 
(Behringer & Morrow, 48-49.) 
4.3 Benefits 
One of the considerable benefits of using core hiding not already mentioned is 
the optimization of the GRT. Since all customer routes can be moved from 
GRT to VRFs the GRT is considerably shorter and has improved convergence 
throughout the ISP core. Furthermore, the IGP can be tuned in order to reach 
even more efficient convergence times should a link failure occur. (Pepelnjak 
& Guichard 2009, 253-254.) With prefix suppression configured the GRT can 
consist of only loopback and management addresses (Cisco Systems 2015c).  
Additionally, the possibilities brought by the separation of GRT can simplify 
the management and configuration of the ISP network. Implementation of IPv6 
connections is also far simpler since only PE routers need to have IPv6 
functionality and only they require additional configuration for the VPNs. P 
router configurations remain fairly plain and adding them to the network is 
easier. Overall core hiding segments the ISP network to a more manageable 
form. 
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4.4 Downsides 
Among the downsides is the initial added complexity when migrating to core 
hiding. In addition MPLS is required for all routers in the entire topology as it is 
the basis for the whole operation. (Cisco Systems 2014a.) Maintaining the full 
Internet routing table in a VRF can also cause complications. This is because 
routes in VRF routing table require about three times more memory than they 
do in GRT (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 88). The added memory consumption 
can also lead to problems with the other PE routers. Management outside of 
the ISP network also becomes more complicated as the management needs 
to be connected to the GRT in one way or another. Managing CE (Customer 
Edge) routers also requires further adjustments if accessed from within the 
ISP network. 
5 SECURITY OF CORE HIDING 
Core hiding has notable inherent security advantages in addition to previously 
mentioned benefits. These advantages can help secure the operator network 
in its entirety. Regardless of the security created by the architecture itself it is 
not flawless and requires knowledge of what elements are left vulnerable. 
5.1 Features 
Due to the separation of VPNs and GRT accessing the operator routers from 
the outside is nearly impossible. Denial of service attacks cannot be targeted 
at the GRT IP addresses even if they were somehow discovered. Intrusion 
attacks to the P routers are out of the question and the only attackable 
interfaces in the PE routers are in the VRFs. (Behringer 2006, 8-9.) These 
interfaces can be secured with ACLs (Access Control Lists) to further improve 
the security. While it may seem that these would be the only ACLs needed for 
the entire operator network, it would leave the GRT if somehow accessed 
completely vulnerable. 
Since MPLS VPNs do not offer data confidentiality it is possible to use IPsec 
tunnels from customer router to another. This can be used to complement the 
security offered by the MPLS VPN architecture. Regardless the traffic of the 
VPNs is separated from one another and accessing another VPN is not 
possible when properly configured. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 197-198.) 
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In addition to any IP packets targeted to GRT address space being dropped 
by the VRF interfaces any labeled packets will also be dropped as they are 
not expected on the interface. This prevents any attempts of label spoofing 
from the outside networks. Packets with destination addresses in other VPNs 
will also be discarded as the VRF routing tables are separate for each VPN. 
(Behringer & Morrow 2005, 58-59.) 
5.2 Risks 
As noted before, the VRF interfaces of the PE routers remain vulnerable to 
both intrusion and denial of service attacks. It is therefore imperative to secure 
them with proper iACLs (infrastructure Access Control Lists) which prevent 
any malicious attempts. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 164-165.) A PE router in 
the hands of a capable hacker can even get access to all the VPNs in the 
MPLS cloud through manipulating RTs. Also any PE router should remain 
functional under the full load that can be caused by a DDoS attack to a VPN. 
This ensures that attacking a VPN through the ISP does not interfere with the 
traffic of other VPN customers. Shared CPU and memory resources between 
the VRFs and GRT should also be noted in planning for DoS resistance. 
(Behringer & Morrow 2005, 83-85, 104-106.) 
Routing protocol of the VRF can be vulnerable to attacks from the directly 
connected router if a dynamic routing protocol is used. The routing table of a 
single PE router VRF could be manipulated and these malicious routes would 
be propagated to any other VRF instances connected to the same MPLS VPN 
service. Therefore static routing is the preferred option to use in the PE router 
VRFs. In the event that a dynamic routing protocol is required for the 
connection between the PE router VRF and CE router BGP is the most secure 
option due to having the best features for preventing any attacks on the 
routing protocol. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 172-173, 178-179.) 
Besides the vulnerabilities of a dynamic routing protocol several other 
mandatory protocols could be used as an attack vector for the VRFs. These 
protocols and services are often required or necessary for the customers and 
therefore cannot be excluded from the MPLS VPN for the sake of security. For 
example ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing/poisoning remains a 
notable risk and DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) relaying can be 
exploited for malicious attacks on targeted VRF interfaces. Each protocol and 
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service needs to be individually considered and secured to prevent such 
attempts. Respectively any unnecessary protocols that could pose a threat to 
security should be disabled on the VRF interface. (Behringer & Morrow 2005, 
139-142.) 
Remote management from outside the operator network is also a possible 
security risk. It can compromise the security of the entire operator network 
especially if a PE router is taken control of. P routers cannot affect the VPNs 
directly and are therefore a lesser risk. Thus any remote management needs 
to have sufficient security measures in place. Regardless the management 
system within the ISP network should not be neglected either. (Behringer & 
Morrow 2005, 39-40.) 
Any misconfiguration performed by the personnel is a noteworthy risk. Special 
attention should be paid to what resources and services the VPNs might have 
and should have access to. A simple misconfiguration of a RT could 
compromise the security of both VPNs affected by the change. Peering ISPs 
should also be trustworthy and have proper contract terms to avoid any 
possible harmful effects on the operation of the operator network. This needs 
to be considered as one of the possible outside threats to the ISP network. 
(Behringer & Morrow 2005, 34-36.) 
6 CORE HIDING MIGRATION 
Core Hiding was originally offered as a subject choice by Vesa Kankare during 
project course in September 2014. Markus Autio agreed with the selection of 
this subject for the project despite both the participants lacking previous 
knowledge in the topic. Therefore the project course itself consisted mainly of 
learning about the topic and its central concepts along with the testing and 
planning of the upcoming migration operation. After the conclusion of the 
project course this work continued as a thesis based on the aforementioned 
learning and planning. The plan made during the project course was still 
incomplete and required further additions and adjustments before the final 
core hiding migration operation. 
6.1 Objectives 
The main objectives laid out during the project have remained mostly the 
same for the thesis following it. The most essential objective was to implement 
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core hiding for the IPv6 connections of SimuNet. Initially this only included the 
IPv6 Internet connection of ICTLAB through SimuNet. Later it was revealed 
that the servers of SimuNet needed to be incorporated to the core hiding 
implementation for their continued IPv6 Internet access. Therefore all IPv6 
connections and their routes were to be separated from the GRT of SimuNet. 
For added challenge and realism the implementation of core hiding was to be 
conducted as a migration. This would ensure minimal interruptions in the 
current IPv6 functionality of SimuNet. Additionally the downtime caused by the 
operation was to be as unnoticeable as possible. However, the operation was 
still to be performed during regular working hours which further emphasized 
the importance of proper planning and preparation for the migration. 
Lastly, the entire project was to be diligently documented including the plans, 
used commands and their final results. The documentation started during the 
project course and was to be continued until the end of the thesis project. The 
thesis and its documentation of the migration could therefore later be used for 
further projects or studies of the same topic. Moreover, the thesis could be 
used by future students for learning about the subject.  
6.2 Basis 
Initially the IPv6 traffic of ICTLAB traversed through SimuNet’s MPLS network 
(Figure 10). SimuNet itself was running only IPv4 in its core and the 
forwarding of the IPv6 traffic was possible through the use of MPLS labels. 
Therefore no IPv6 addresses were revealed during an IPv6 traceroute through 
the network but determining the hop count was still possible.  
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Figure 10. Layout of SimuNet (Kankare 2011, 12) 
In terms of MPLS functionality SimuNet utilized OSPF as the IGP to support 
LDP. The iBGP (internal Border Gateway Protocol) connections between PE 
routers of SimuNet were enhanced by the use of route reflectors and had the 
IPv6 address-families already configured. The Internet connection for ICTLAB 
entered the MPLS network of Simunet through PE4 and exited SimuNet at 
PE3. Furthermore, the servers of SimuNet were connected to both PE3 and 
PE4. Static IPv6 routes were employed for the IPv6 connections through 
SimuNet while the Internet connection in PE3 had EBGP (External Border 
Gateway Protocol) configured with the peering service provider. 
7 MIGRATION PLANS AND PREPARATION 
Due to unfamiliarity with the subject a great deal of time had to be spent 
learning about MPLS VPNs and its concepts during the project course. Case 
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studies regarding the subject were completed to further add to knowledge on 
the subject after the initial reading and learning. The actual planning was 
started alongside these case study practices as the structure and phases of 
the core hiding migration became clearer. The original case studies were 
further adapted to imitate the planned operation as the project course 
continued (Figure 11). The case studies and exercises during the project 
course were conducted using IPv4 to ease the learning of MPLS VPN 
functionality.  
 
Figure 11. The final adapted case study of the project course (Kettunen 2011) 
Towards the end the exercises focused more on the specific protocols and 
configuration commands necessary for the final result of the core hiding 
migration. Therefore a basis imitating SimuNet using IPv4 was utilized to 
determine and rehearse the exact additions necessary for the desired 
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functionality. These additions included the creation of VRFs and connecting 
them to each other through the use of MP-BGP while also transferring the 
customer and Internet interfaces and their routing to the created VRFs. 
Moreover the TTL propagation needed to be disabled in the PE routers to 
achieve the desired core hiding effect. 
7.1 Methods for achieving objectives 
The repeated exercises with case studies were used as a basis for the initial 
command plan for the migration. This command plan would later help ensure 
the fast and effective implementation of core hiding in SimuNet. Furthermore, 
the use of the command plan would minimize the downtime and interruption 
caused by the migration operation. The initial command plan produced over 
the project course would later be altered to use IPv6 commands instead of 
IPv4. The command plan was written in a format that would allow simply 
copying and pasting of its contents to the specified router.  
In addition to the final command plan a backup plan was prepared in case the 
migration operation was not successful. While the final command plan should 
contain no erroneous commands or mistakes a set of reverse commands was 
created to cancel the changes if necessary. This would limit the downtime 
caused by a potential fault in the command plan and restore the network to its 
previous functionality. It would then be possible to correct the flaw in the 
configuration command(s) without fear of causing further harm. 
7.2 Original migration plan 
During the project course the initial migration plan was suggested and 
introduced by Vesa Kankare. This plan would utilize the use of a jumper cable 
on one of the involved PE routers to temporarily direct traffic while the 
migration operation was being conducted. After core hiding was implemented 
on each PE router this jumper cable would then be removed and the network 
would resume its normal operation with the improved core hiding functionality. 
This type of migration plan was prepared and rehearsed during the project 
course and was intended to be used for the final migration operation. 
The migration plan with jumper cable consisted of two distinct phases for the 
operation. The first phase of the plan started with the inclusion of jumper cable 
on one of the customer side PE routers. The PE router in question would 
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therefore be required to have two free interfaces to use for the jumper cable. 
Afterwards a VRF would be created on the PE router and one of the interfaces 
with the jumper cable would be configured to be part of the newly created 
VRF. The same VRF could then be created on the rest of the PE routers 
involved in the core hiding implementation and connected to each other 
through MP-BGP configuration (Figure 12). Rest of the customer side PE 
routers could then have their interfaces migrated to the created VRF one by 
one if necessary. Static routes would be needed for each of the customer PE 
routers added to the MPLS VPN in addition to a static route directing traffic to 
the Internet PE router still operating with GRT. The first phase would be 
concluded once each customer PE router was connected through MPLS VPN 
and had their Internet traffic routed through the jumper cable to the Internet 
PE router. The downtime for each customer in the MPLS VPN would be 
minimal and the first phase could be completed on the routers one by one.  
 
Figure 12. State of the network during the first phase of jumper cable migration plan 
Following the successful completion of the first phase of the migration plan 
was the relatively shorter second phase. During this phase the Internet PE 
router would finally be configured to be a part of the existing MPLS VPN 
(Figure 13). Once the Internet PE router was connected to the customer PE 
routers through MP-BGP the jumper cable would no longer be used for routing 
traffic. The jumper cable could then be removed along with the temporary 
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static routes needed for the first phase. Lastly the proper operation of the 
MPLS VPN tunnels and core hiding was tested and confirmed and the second 
phase of the migration plan was concluded. 
 
Figure 13. State of the network by the end of the second phase of jumper cable migration plan 
Naturally, the migration plan with the jumper cable was not entirely flawless or 
guaranteed to succeed. For the majority of the first phase and before finishing 
the second phase the functionality of the network relied heavily on the jumper 
cable and the PE router in question. A single failure in the operation of either 
could cause severe downtime and delay the completion of the implementation. 
Furthermore, the PE router with the jumper cable would need to have the 
capacity to reliably forward the traffic between the customers and Internet for 
the duration of the operation. Regardless the use of jumper cable was 
appropriate for a large scale migration that was thought to occur in SimuNet. 
Later during the project it became clearer that the migration in SimuNet would 
not be as extensive as the plans that were made for it were. Thus the 
migration plan was adapted for a simpler and more direct approach. 
7.3 Customized migration plan 
The adapted migration plan consisted of two phases similar to those of the 
original plan. More specifically the first phase included the commands that 
could be input in preparation for the second phase without affecting the 
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current functionality of the network. The second phase contained the 
configuration commands to complete the implementation of the required 
protocols for core hiding and migrate the necessary addresses and routing to 
the VRFs. Finally the functionality of the implementation would be tested and 
verified to ensure the objectives were met. 
Since the VRFs, static routes for the VRFs and VPNv6 address-families could 
be configured in preparation for the second phase their operation was tested 
and verified before the second phase. Once the configured static routes were 
relayed to the other PE router correctly the first phase was verifiably complete. 
During the second phase, the configuration commands for migrating the rest 
of the functions were used, and a minor interruption in the forwarding of traffic 
could be observed. More accurately the IPv6 using interfaces of PE3 and PE4 
and the EBGP connection with the peering service provider along with the 
routes were migrated to the VRFs. Additionally, the propagation of TTL values 
on the MPLS forwarded packets would be disabled. Afterwards the continued 
function of the Internet connection of ICTLAB and the concealing of the 
SimuNet core would be verified before concluding the migration operation. 
8 MIGRATION IMPLEMENTATION 
Once the customized migration command plan was prepared and tested with 
the ICTLAB laboratory equipment it was time to move forward towards the 
actual implementation. An IPv4 SSH connection from a workstation in ICTLAB 
was used for the configuration of PE3 and PE4 in order to avoid any possible 
interruptions in the configuration during the migration itself. During the testing 
of the first phase it was noted that an additional command was required in the 
plan for PE3 in order to be able to use IPv6 in the VRFs. Thus the command 
mls ipv6 vrf was added to the command plan before the creation of the VRF 
to enable its IPv6 functionality (Cisco Systems 2015d). With this addition the 
migration operation could proceed as previously planned. A continuous IPv6 
ping was also setup before starting the migration to monitor any interruptions 
in the IPv6 Internet connection. 
8.1 Planned migration operation 
The migration operation itself started with the creation of a VRF in both PE3 
and PE4 named INTERNET with the command vrf definition INTERNET. 
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Both PE routers were given a unique route distinguisher with the IPv4 
loopback address of the router followed by its corresponding number. For PE3 
this was done with the command rd 172.30.0.3:3. Route targets for both of the 
routers were set to their BGP AS number followed by a number to indicate the 
use of IPv6. This command for both of the PE routers was route-target both 
65001:6. Lastly the use of IPv6 was specified with the command address-
family ipv6. (Figures 14 and 15) 
 
Figure 14. First phase command plan for PE3 
Next were the preparations for MP-BGP and its routing. Firstly the 
configuration mode for the existing BGP process was entered with the 
command router bgp 65001. The VPNv6 configuration was initialized with 
address-family vpnv6 and then configured to connect with the other PE 
router with commands neighbor 172.30.0.4 activate and neighbor 
172.30.0.4 send-community extended in the case of PE3. Afterwards a 
separate address family was created for the created VRF and its routing 
commands with address-family ipv6 vrf INTERNET. Within this mode 
commands redistribute connected, redistribute static and default-
information originate were used to ensure the distribution of directly 
connected and static routes to the neighbor(s) connected via VPNv6 address 
family. Additionally the existing EBGP routing with the peering IPv6 service 
provider was configured within the address family in advance to enable its 
safe removal from the GRT of PE3 in the second phase. The EBGP routing 
would then start to operate within the VRF due to commands neighbor 
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2A00:1DD0:400:102::1 remote-as 65000, neighbor 2A00:1DD0:400:102::1 
activate and neighbor 2A00:1DD0:400:102::1 prefix-list SIMUNET6 out. 
(Figures 14 and 15) 
 
Figure 15. First phase command plan for PE4 
Finally the required IPv6 static routes were pre-configured for the VRF in 
preparation for their removal in the second phase. For PE3 the routes 
included one route to direct the traffic from ICTLAB towards the Internet and 
another to communicate the address space used by ICTLAB to the peering 
service provider. The commands for the new static routes were ipv6 route vrf 
INTERNET ::/0 GigabitEthernet1/9 2A00:1DD0:400:102::1 and ipv6 route 
vrf INTERNET 2A00:1DD0:401::/48 2A00:1DD0:401:F001::2. The latter 
static route advertising the ICTLAB address space was let through by a 
previously configured prefix list SIMUNET6 which did not require any 
additional changes. Furthermore, a static route advertising a more specific 
IPv6 address space from PE4 to PE3 needed to be moved to the VRF. The 
command for this route was ipv6 route vrf INTERNET 
2A00:1DD0:401:100::/56 GigabitEthernet3/0/2 2A00:1DD0:401:F001::2. 
With these preparatory commands entered and their functionality verified the 
second phase of the migration could commence. (Figures 14 and 15) 
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Figure 16. Second phase command plan for PE3 and PE4 
The second phase command plan was considerably shorter than the 
command plan for the first phase since the majority of the commands were 
already entered for the VRFs in advance. At the start of the second phase the 
TTL value propagation to the MPLS labels was disabled with the command no 
mpls ip propagate-ttl forwarded (Cisco Systems 2007). Next were the 
commands that would finalize the migration operation itself. The IPv6 
interfaces of PE3 and PE4 were configured to be a part of the aforementioned 
VRF and therefore had to have their IPv6 addresses reconfigured as well. The 
interface configuration mode was entered and the following commands were 
used for PE4: vrf forwarding INTERNET and ipv6 address 
2A00:1DD0:401:F001::1/64. Additionally for PE4 the existing IPv4 address 
was moved to the VRF with the command ip address 192.168.30.1 
255.255.255.0. Moreover the EBGP connection with the peering service 
provider was removed from the GRT by entering the command no neighbor 
2A00:1DD0:400:102::1 remote-as 65000 in the configuration mode for the 
current BGP routing process. Therefore the previously entered commands for 
the VRF address family would be enabled and the EBGP connection would be 
re-formed once the changes for the VRF interfaces were also processed. 
Finally the remaining unnecessary IPv6 static routes were removed from the 
GRT with the commands no ipv6 route 2A00:1DD0:401::/48 vlan10 
2A00:1DD0:401:A1::4 for PE3 and no ipv6 route 2A00:1DD0:401:100::/56 
GigabitEthernet3/0/2 2A00:1DD0:401:F001::2 for PE4. Hence the originally 
planned migration operation was completed. (Figure 16) 
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8.2 Additional changes 
After the initial migration operation was concluded as planned it turned out 
that the interfaces for the servers of SimuNet would also need to be included 
in the newly created core hiding infrastructure. Thus the relevant static routes 
and the SVIs (Switch Virtual Interfaces) along with both their IPv6 addresses 
and HSRP (Hot Standby Router Protocol) configurations were migrated to the 
VRFs. Since the servers were connected to both PE3 and PE4 their 
advertised static routes were identical. Therefore the commands ipv6 route 
vrf INTERNET 2A00:1DD0:401:B1::/64 Vlan10 FE80:A1::1 and ipv6 route 
vrf INTERNET 2A00:1DD0:401:B2::/64 Vlan20 FE80:A2::1 were used for 
both PE routers and the original static routes were removed with the no form 
of the commands. (Figures 17 and 18) 
 
Figure 17. Additional commands used for PE3 
The SVIs for VLAN 10 and 20 were migrated to the already used VRF by 
entering the command vrf forwarding INTERNET in the interface 
configuration mode. Furthermore, the previous IPv6 and HSRP addresses 
were reattached to the interfaces while the IPv4 HSRP addresses for the 
interfaces were removed as requested. The IPv6 addresses and the router 
advertisement addresses were reconfigured with the commands ipv6 
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address FE80:A1::4 link-local, ipv6 address 2A00:1DD0:401:A1::4/64 and 
ipv6 nd prefix 2A00:1DD0:401:A1::/64 1200 900 in the case of VLAN 10 for 
PE4. The HSRP configuration was redone with the commands standby 110 
ipv6 FE80::1 and standby 110 preempt for VLAN 10 of PE4 and the no form 
commands were used to remove the IPv4 HSRP configuration. HSRP 
priorities for both SVIs were retained as previously by using the commands 
standby 110 priority 150 for VLAN 10 in PE3 and standby 120 priority 150 
for VLAN 20 in PE4. With the above-mentioned changes the IPv6 Internet 
access of the SimuNet servers was restored. (Figures 17 and 18) 
 
Figure 18. Additional commands used for PE4 
Apart from the additions made to rectify the IPv6 access of the SimuNet 
servers an additional optimization improvement was added for PE3 and PE4. 
The default label allocation was changed in order to enhance the efficiency of 
label usage in the network. The command mpls label mode vrf INTERNET 
protocol bgp-vpnv6 per-vrf was entered to change the label allocation mode 
from the default per prefix mode to per VRF mode. This would help with 
maintaining as few VPNv6 labels as needed for core hiding in the future. 
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9 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The interruption caused by the implementation of core hiding in SimuNet was 
relatively minor. Only three requests and replies of the continuous ping were 
lost during the second phase of the migration plan before the IPv6 Internet 
connection was restored (Figure 19). Unfortunately the delayed migration of 
the SimuNet server IPv6 connections inflicted a considerably longer downtime 
before the configuration was corrected. Nevertheless, the prepared reverse 
commands for the final command plan were not needed during the migration 
operation. 
 
Figure 19. Continuous ping during the second phase of the migration plan 
In order to verify the functionality of the VRF the command show vrf ipv6 
detail was used at the end the first phase and the second phase of the 
implementation (Figure 20). Route distinguisher and route targets could be 
reviewed from the output of the command. In addition the altered label 
allocation mode and the label used could be seen from the output of the 
command. The result of this command can be reviewed in the figure below 
(Figure 20). As the SVIs of the server connections were added to the VRF at a 
later point only the interface towards the ISP is shown under the connected 
interfaces. 
 
Figure 20. Output show vrf ipv6 detail after the completion of the original migration plan 
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The requested interfaces and their related routes were both transferred from 
GRT to the VRF. Figures showing the GRT and VRF routing table can be 
found below for comparison (Figures 21 and 22). The transferred static routes 
and EBGP connection were erased from the GRT in order to reduce the 
amount of remaining routes in the table and to further optimize the network. 
The command show ipv6 route vrf INTERNET was also used during the first 
phase of the implementation to confirm the relaying of the entered static 
routes between PE3 and PE4 VRFs.  
 
Figure 21. Output show ipv6 route before the start of the implementation operation 
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Figure 22. Output of show ipv6 route vrf INTERNET after the completion of the migration 
plan and additional changes 
An IPv6 traceroute was performed to assess the degree of information 
available about SimuNet with this simple command. Two hops were shown in 
the output but due to the IPv4 core of SimuNet no further addresses within the 
core were revealed. With the core hiding implementation completed the output 
showed only one remaining hop with no IPv6 address when the same 
traceroute command was used. The remaining visible hop was presumably a 
link outside the core of SimuNet as the TTL propagation for forwarded packets 
of PE3 and PE4 was disabled during the operation. (Figure 23) 
 
Figure 23. Traceroute to the edge of SimuNet from an ICTLAB workstation before the 
implementation 
Some difficulties were met at the start and during the implementation 
operation that were not noticed during the testing of the implementation. 
However, these problems did not impede the progress significantly and the 
core hiding implementation was successful. Alas the objective for as minor 
downtime in the network functionality as possible was not entirely met due to 
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the late addition of the server interfaces to the core hiding infrastructure. 
Overall the most vital objective was met regardless of the adversities 
hampering the pursuit of flawless migration execution. 
9.1 Effects on security  
While the IPv6 traffic of SimuNet was label switched through the core network 
even before the core hiding implementation the further separation of IPv6 
interfaces from the GRT improved the inherent security of the network. In the 
future this would allow greater focus for securing the edges of the ISP network 
as opposed to securing each network element separately. The overall security 
within the core network should not be neglected regardless of this change but 
the VRF interfaces on the PE routers could be hardened against outside 
attacks better than before.  
On the whole the amount of vulnerable points of attacks within the network 
was reduced as well as the degree of information that could be gathered from 
outside the network when preparing for an attack. Any attacks from an IPv6 
network could only be directed to the IPv6 VRF interfaces of the ISP network. 
Also the scope and extent of the core network along with possible IPv6 
addresses within could not be determined from outside of the core. However, 
further improvements should be made in the future to block most forms of 
attacks and reconnaissance targeted towards the remaining vulnerable 
interfaces.  
9.2 Effects on overall functionality 
In addition to overall security benefits of core hiding, the general functionality 
of the network was changed and in many ways enhanced. With the separation 
of VRF and GRT address spaces any unnecessary remnants of IPv6 could be 
removed from the core without affecting the passing labeled traffic through the 
network. Furthermore, the separate routing of the GRT and VRFs opened 
further opportunities for fine-tuning either in their desired aspects without 
disrupting the other. The ISP network could use the known and reliable IPv4 
protocols without compromising the functionality of any IPv6 services offered 
to the customers. 
The tunneling possibilities of a core hidden network could be further utilized to 
offer the required services to each customer while still maintaining the 
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independence of core network. Additionally the superior scalability and 
redundancy of core hiding could be capitalized on to ensure consistent level of 
service and room for future growth. Moreover the possible enhancements of 
fault tolerance would limit the damage in case of device failure or 
misconfiguration to the affected VRFs and VPNs. 
10 FURTHER STUDIES/PROJECTS 
Naturally, one of the possible next steps would be separating any remaining 
IPv4 or IPv6 connections which do not need access to the core network into 
their own VRFs if such a change is deemed reasonable. Also any testing or 
otherwise currently unnecessary interfaces or routes could be removed to 
further tidy up the GRT and improve its convergence. This could even be 
followed up by implementing prefix suppression for the core network to 
enhance the benefits offered by core hiding (Cisco Systems 2015c). With the 
prefix suppression implemented the GRT could consist of only the necessary 
loopback and management addresses for the network functionality and 
protocols.  
Aside from reducing the amount of routes within the GRT the IGP could be 
fine-tuned to improve the convergence and fault tolerance of the core network. 
If the routers supported the use of segment routing it could also be 
implemented to eliminate the reliance of LDP on the IGP convergence. 
Otherwise MPLS LDP-IGP synchronization could be implemented to remedy 
the issues caused by this reliance (Cisco Systems 2005). This synchronization 
would help avoid situations caused by either protocol being in a different state 
within the core network such as the breaking of a LSP. Such an occurrence 
could cause severe amounts of packet loss until the problem was detected 
and fixed. Furthermore, the general failure detection and propagation of the 
network protocols could be enhanced to diminish the harm caused by any 
defects. 
Regarding the security of the ISP core network a number of different 
improvements could be made to complement the core hiding functionality. 
Authentication for LDP and the IGP traffic could be enabled to protect from 
possible attacks within the core network. More importantly the VRF interfaces 
could have their security hardened to prevent attacks on the edges of the core 
network. Infrastructure access lists could be implemented for these vulnerable 
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interfaces as well as specific security measures for protocols and services 
necessary on these interfaces. Thus the remaining exploitable attack vectors 
could be blocked to take full advantage of the overall improved security 
offered by the core hiding implementation. Apart from preventing outside 
attacks a form of monitoring such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System) could 
be used to observe potential attacks on the Internet VRF interface.  
All things considered there are numerous ways to further improve and utilize 
the benefits offered by core hiding. Whichever aspect is given the highest 
priority can be the first target of further research. Alternatively the current 
implementation of core hiding could be altered or expanded if such action is 
deemed necessary. 
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